We examine the relations between monetary and fiscal policies in the context of a model which embodies relevant features of EMU. Our analysis suggests that, even in the absence of asymmetric shocks and of aggregate demand spillovers, EC authorities and national governments may have conflicting incentives, depending upon the relative size of demand and supply disturbances. When both aggregate demand and supply shocks are positive (negative) and the latter are large enough in absolute terms, then national governments will pursue a more expansionary (contractionary) fiscal policy than it would be desirable from a social welfare standpoint.
1 Introduction "In the third stage of EMU, Member States shall avoid excessive general government deficits: this is a clear Treaty obligation. The European Council underlines the importance of safeguarding sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation. It is also necessary to ensure that national budgetary policies support stability-oriented monetary policies. Adherence to the objective of sound budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus will allow all Member States to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations while keeping the government deficit within the reference value of 3% of GDP."(Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, adopted at Amsterdam, June 1997) 1 .
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relations between monetary and fiscal policies in the context of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The quotation reported above makes three points, which are relevant in this respect: national budgetary policies should (i) be inspired by the commitment to "respect the medium-term budgetary objective of close to balance or in surplus"; (ii) "support stability-oriented monetary policies"; (iii) be able to "deal with normal cyclical fluctuations while keeping the government deficit within the reference value of 3% of GDP". The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG), which the European Council is required to formulate in terms of the Article 99 of the Treaty of Maastricht 2 , is the official document by means of which Member States effectively coordinate their economic policies.
On matters of fiscal policy, the Treaty of Maastricht was essentially concerned only in ensuring fiscal discipline, so as to prevent threats to monetary stability. We believe that the new formulation of the objectives and constraints of fiscal policy, which has been adopted after the Treaty of Amsterdam, goes well beyond the simple emphasis of the Treaty of Maastricht. Moreover, we also think that this formulation poses a challenge to a recent but widespread tradition in economic modelling, which has been used to ar-gue in favor of central bank independence (CBI). Within this tradition, the only challenge from fiscal policy to CBI appears when an "indisciplined" fiscal policy, possibly unsustainable in the long run, forces the central bank to give up its independence and monetize the fiscal debt (Sargent and Wallace, 1981) . In fact, we argue below that even perfectly sustainable (in the long run) fiscal policies may undermine the policy stance adopted by the monetary authority. For instance, a (relatively more) expansive fiscal policy (even within the 3% reference value) will have an expansionary effect on aggregate demand and consequently also on the rate of inflation. Thus, a more expansive (but perfectly sustainable and "disciplined") fiscal policy could potentially undermine the stance of monetary policy in the pursuit of price stability.
If our argument is correct, then it follows not only that monetary policy should be governed by an independent authority, but also that national budgetary policies should be coordinated with it 3 . This argument is compatible with the Treaty of Maastricht, but clearly goes beyond it. Moreover, in order to formulate this argument precisely, an appropriate analytical framework would be required. Another question, which should also be addressed in this framework, is whether the "division of labor" between monetary and fiscal policies, which is envisaged by the Stability and Growth Pact, is optimal from the point of view of the member countries of EMU.
Our aim with this paper is to propose a framework, where these questions can be formally addressed. In fact, given the advanced status of institutional developments in the European Union (EU), it is surprising that such a framework has not yet been shared by a larger body of literature. To underline this point, in this introduction we first compare the status of mainstream thinking on monetary policy at the dawn of the EMU (which we identify as the drafting of the Treaty of Maastricht, in 1991) with current developments on the effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling prices and -in the meantime -in affecting aggregate demand. The main evolution in this area may be synthesized as the demise of the Lucas supply function, consequent to the adoption of a hypothesis of short-run price rigidity. We dramatize this evolution by telling the story of when Rip van Winkle, a character well known to all the macroeconomists of the same generation of one of the two coauthors, went to sleep for a second time in 1991 4 , to awake only at the beginning of the new millennium, Year 1991 When Rip van Winkle went to sleep for the second time at the end of 1991, he thought his ideas about macroeconomics and monetary policy were, broadly speaking, reasonably clear. The first thing he was sure of, was that monetary policy should be primarily focused on price stability. The thought that this important prescription had been at last acknowledged by economists and politicians alike, and that it had been embodied in such an important piece of constitutional architecture as the Treaty of Maastricht, satisfied him. Moreover, Rip was aware that most economists would also suggest that, to back up such an important statement, it would have been useful, if not strictly necessary, to enclose a strong statement on central bank independence. This indeed had been written in clear letters also in the Treaty of Maastricht. Rip was also aware, however, that the reasons why economists and politicians both agreed on this point would often be different. Economists on average wanted a conservative central bank, that would surely refrain from too much output stabilization. Politicians instead (at least when they set at the constitutional drawing table, far removed from their constituencies) thought that it was a good thing to keep the central bankers removed from the tempting sirens of fiscal accommodation. To this purpose, indeed, it was the politicians who put several specific clauses in the Treaty, although Rip was well aware that, according to some economists (for instance, to Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini, 1993) some of those clauses were perhaps too strict, either because they gave too much leeway to the ECB, or because they did not leave enough room for fiscal stabilization (a task which, in a monetary union with decentralized fiscal authorities and a ridiculously small central budget, should naturally be assigned to national fiscal authorities).
Another thing about which Rip was convinced was that, if monetary policy was to have real effects, it would have to be only in the short run, and only through price (or inflation) surprises. When he went to sleep, the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, restated (that is, microfounded) as the Lucas supply function, was all the rage in upbeat macroeconomics textbooks, and together with it went the nice corollary that any rule-based (that is, systematic) monetary policy would be ineffective. Also, having read several papers by Barro and Gordon and others, Rip was convinced that, if you left central bankers to run things their way, most of them would have spent most of their time trying to fool people with inflation surprises. Of course, Rip agreed that people were smart enough not to let themselves be fooled more than a few times in a row. But for some reason most economists, and Rip was one of them, thought that central bankers had never learned that old saying or, to put it more technically -which nevertheless amounts to the same thing -, thought that a central banker would continue to design ad infinitum the same, one-period ahead optimal (time-inconsistent) plans, as if they were faced by memory-less, atomistic agents 5 . The world about which Rip was sure he knew enough monetary economics of, could thus be described by two simple equations:
where y is the log level of aggregate demand, y * its natural (full-employment) level; m the log money stock, p the log of the price level, π the rate of inflation, E(·) the expectations operator, a, k positive parameters and ζ 1 , ζ 2 i.i.d shocks. Thinking of policy issues, there was not much one could do, at the macro level, in the way of affecting output by means of systematic policy actions. The analysis of macroeconomic policies apparently had turned into a pretty unexciting field and, with this scenario in his mind, Rip went back to sleep.
Year 2001
When Rip woke up again, it was the turn of a new century and a new millennium. One of the first things he became aware of, was that events had indeed followed the course foreseen by Treaty of Maastricht, and that the European Economic and Monetary Union had become true. Rip was pleased, although he did not quite understand why some countries had chosen to stay out of it, and why the euro was losing so much value against the dollar, and but noticing that prices and public finances were, after all, quite stable and under control, he thought that the simple normative macroeconomic statements of one decade ago had fared remarkably well. So Rip decided that he should not waste too much time on monetary issues, and that there were certainly more interesting or exciting issues to experience and explore, and that he should become acquainted with the new features and attractions of living in the new millennium.
One day, casually, Rip found himself reading what at first looked like a very awkward debate. The press reported that the European Commission, and soon thereafter the Council of Ministers, had taken the unusual step of making a formal recommendation against one country, Ireland, which was accused of pursuing fiscal policies not coordinated with the rest of the EU. But, to Rip's surprise, Ireland was running a fiscal surplus of about 4% of its GDP, and also its debt level, below 40%, was one of the safest in the Union. "Ireland is well within the Maastricht guidelines, -cried Rip -so what is the matter?". This sparkled his curiosity. One of the things Rip liked most of the new millennium was, of course, Internet. He promptly logged on, and started searching his ways around some official documents. He found a few that only contributed to further arouse his curiosity:
Exhibit 1 (The European Commission on fiscal-monetary interrelations) "Contrary to the fears of many observers during the policy controversies at the beginning of 1999, the cyclical downturn did not trigger a general move towards expansionary fiscal policies which could have implied a loss of credibility of the commitment to budgetary discipline. This contributed to the credibility of the whole EMU stability-oriented policy framework. As a result, monetary policy could be eased in the course of 1999 so as to support growth without jeopardizing price stability in the euro area" ( Exhibit 4 (The European Central Bank on the AS-AD explanation of inflation) "In order to assess risks to price stability, it is important to know whether shocks originate on the supply or the demand side, have an external or domestic origin or are temporary or permanent. (...) In line with standard models of the business cycle, this analysis is often centered on the effects of the interplay between supply and demand and/or cost pressures on pricing behavior in the goods, services and labor markets" ( ECB, The two pillars of the ECB's monetary policy strategy, Monthly Bulletin, November 2000, p.43).
Exhibit 5 (The European Central Bank on inflationary fiscal policy, I) "Fiscal budgets are on average still not close to balance or in surplus and debt ratios are high. A proper response by fiscal policies at this stage would help to curb the emergence of inflation expectations which could otherwise affect the medium-term inflation outlook." (id., p. 26).
Exhibit 6 (The European Central Bank on inflationary fiscal policy, II) "The expansionary fiscal policies planned for this year [2001] in a number of euro area countries are not conducive to containing aggregate demand and inflationary pressures. Particularly in the countries experiencing high economic growth rates, inflationary pressures will receive an additional stimulus from expansionary fiscal policies" (ECB Annual Report 2000, May 2001, p. 47).
To say the least, Rip was puzzled. It's all about aggregate demand management, he thought. But where is the (expectations augmented) Phillips curve? Had he been awakened now in a world where Robert E. Lucas had never been alive? Back on the Net, he was relieved to find that Lucas had been awarded the 1995 Nobel Prize in Economics. Relieved but still puzzled: they gave him the Nobel and then forgot about all his work? He went to search for Lucas' Nobel Lecture. It was a fascinating reading, deep and intellectually intriguing and technically accomplished. Also a pleasure to read. Towards the end of the paper, however, Rip stumbled: "Estimates ... indicated that only small fractions of output variability can be accounted for by unexpected price movements. Though the evidence seems to show that monetary surprises have real effects, they do not seem to be transmitted through price surprises, as in Lucas (1972) " (Lucas, 1996 , p. 679).
Oh gosh!, thought Rip, then something has changed in the macro foundations of monetary economics. Rip slowly became aware that, precisely in the era when central banks had been most willing and able to conquer inflation, the macroeconomics of temporary price rigidity was back in fashion. He sought human advice, a little chat with his friends over a glass of beer. Friends told him of the renaissance of neo-Keynesian macroeconomics and that many macro models were now embodying an assumption about prices (or inflation) being rigid, or predetermined in the short run. They also gave him several papers to read. After a little study, Rip thought that he had familiarized himself with the new literature. In particular, he borrowed from a paper of Svensson's (1997) two often-recurring equations, which he thought neatly formalized the aggregate observable implications of the new approach. Although he was well aware that assumptions about lags were quite crucial, Rip decided that he wanted to concentrate his thoughts on a simple, timeless structure. Thus he simplified Svensson's equations to:
Aggregate supply :
where i is a short rate of interest, π * is the target level of inflation (and also its expected value, in the absence of shocks), r is the equilibrium level of the short real rate of interest, α, β are two positive parameters and ε 1 , ε 1 are two i.i.d shocks. Along with these came a third equation, which was in fact the first order condition out of the minimization of a loss function of a central bank. This equation was generically referred to as an optimal Taylor rule, similar in its reduced form to the ad hoc rules proposed in Taylor (1993) . It was indeed an interest rate setting equation showing that the real short-run rate of interest should positively respond to both the output gap (y − y * ) and the inflation gap (π − π * ). 'And where is money?' Rip asked himself. So he learned that indeed the new fashion (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000) was to describe all monetary policy strategies, also those pursued by almost monetarist-central banks, using those interest rate rules, even out of an optimizing framework. 'But where is money?' asked Rip again. To his relief, he discovered that money could still be in the picture, although somewhat in the background (Woodford, 1997) .
That same night, Rip set at his desk, with a few papers in front of him. He was thinking about the issue of coordinating demand management. It was slowly becoming clear to him that indeed, if you accept the principle that monetary policy affects aggregate demand directly and more quickly than it does affect inflation, than the issue of coordinating monetary and fiscal policies was not a trivial one at all. All that policy debate, all those claims about the need to coordinate, after all, where not at all inappropriate! Still, Rip began to be puzzled about a new issue. He felt he needed a model to analyze the whole question. But he did not recall having read, in the past, any model suitable for the problem at hand 7 . And clearly the newspaper clippings he had collected (although some of those had actually been authored by respected economists) showed that only the surface of the whole issue was being openly discussed. Had all the economists been taken by surprise? Going back to more academic readings, Rip found, in a recent article by Taylor (2000) two almost identical policy rules: one for monetary policyan ordinary Taylor rule -and one for the fiscal deficit. Both however shared almost the same functional form and right hand-side arguments: the output gap and the inflation gap. So if they are both reacting to the output gap, thought Rip, shouldn't they coordinate? Rip realized that perhaps the EU Commission was trying to prevent the ECB and the fiscal authorities from putting too much stimulus in the economy at the same time. If this is the case, then they should have a model to explain this! And even if no one has
done it yet, it should be easy to write down such a model, thought Rip. So he went back to his two equations, and did a simple change to the AD: 8 9 AD with fiscal impulse :
where f is a measure of the fiscal impulse , i.e. the ratio between the government deficit (f > 0) or surplus and GDP, and is η a positive parameter. Now I shall solve the model of equations (4) and (5), thought Rip, and obtain optimal policy rules for fiscal and monetary authorities. So he tried to do. But soon encountered a problem. Indeed he could write down two structural equations and two policy instruments, and also two loss functions, but that was not enough. In fact, both instruments acted upon aggregate demand, so in fact they could not be treated as separate instruments: they were like the same instrument in the hands of two different policy makers. So Rip thought a bit more. He sketched a few equations, compared them, and then jotted down the following outline of things to be done: Section 2: Objective functions of the monetary and fiscal authorities Section 3-4: Monetary and fiscal policy with decentralized fiscal authorities Section 5: Conclusions and implications for policy analysis.
Rip added a few words and hints next to each section title. He thought it all looked neat and easy, and that anybody who had gotten to that point could easily wrap things up. He felt he had suggested the right framework to analyze the issue, and his intuition told him that a nice solution was waiting to be unfolded. But he was happy with that, and decided he did not want to be bothered any more with too many equations. He put his notes in an envelope, mailed it to us and went back to sleep. We continue on his tracks, beginning in the following section. 8 After writing this down, Rip shouted: "But this is Pangloss!". We thought this to be a reference to the famous character in a novel by the French philosopher, Voltaire. However, one referee kindly pointed out to us that most probably this was a reference to a paper by the contemporary Dutch economist, Buiter (1980, eq. 5). 9 Rip also found this formulation to be coherent with a recent, authoritative survey of monetary policy issues in the US by Benjamin Friedman (2000, p.1): "Monetary policy is one of the two principal means (the other being fiscal policy) by which government authorities in a market economy regularly influence the pace and direction of overall economic activity, importantly including not only the level of aggregate output and employment but also the general rate at which prices rise or fall. Indeed, the predominant trend over the last half century has been to place increasing emphasis on monetary policy (and correspondingly less on fiscal policy) for these purposes".
The objective functions of monetary and fiscal authorities
In this paper, we want to model the strategic interaction of three types of policymakers: the European Commission and the European Council, which for our analytical purpose will be identifies as a single agent (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national governments, which act as the decentralized fiscal authorities (FA). The ECB sets the monetary policy stance, and both its independence and mandate are clearly defined in the Treaty of Maastricht, as we also discussed in the Introduction. Since the mandate of the ECB is clearly lexicographic 10 , we assume that its main goal is to stabilize inflation around a chosen target value. Note that this does not preclude output stabilization, to the extent that this is an intermediate step for controlling the inflationary pressures that might follow from shocks to aggregate demand (see Svensson, 1997 ). However we assume that the ECB is not concerned with the level of demand per se in its loss function. Moreover, it has often been observed both in theory 11 and in empirical work that central banks are also motivated by a desire to reduce the volatility of the (nominal or real) rates of interest 12 : this argument has been advanced in reference to the Fed but clearly, given the experience of its first three years of operation, it applies even more strongly to the ECB. Also, this is consistent with the ECB own view that it should aim to maintain price stability "over the medium term".
As regards the EC, the authorities in Brussels have a very limited direct budgetary power, as the size of the EC budget is constrained within 1.27% of the aggregate GDP. However, the procedures and penalties instituted with the Stability and Growth Pact allow the EC to set and control the behavior of national FA. Moreover, as the mandate of the ECB is derived from the Treaty establishing the European Community, we also assume that the EC authorities act as the principal of the ECB. Hence, we shall assume that the EC sets its guidelines for fiscal policy taking into account a "social welfare 10 The mandate is precisely defined in Art.105 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 11 For instance, Walsh (1998, ch.10) surveys some motives why the central bank might attach a positive value to interest rate smoothing. 12 The inclusion of a term in the volatility of interest rates in regression equations is also required to account for the observed persistence or graduality in the setting of the Federal Funds rate. See Favero and Rovelli (2001) .
function" defined for the community as a whole, and thus including the preference for price stability as well as for output stabilization in each member country 13 . For the FA, it is natural to assume that each member country is mainly concerned with domestic output stabilization. It is also plausible to assume that, in this respect, national FA will not fully internalize the spillovers of each country's fiscal stance on the aggregate demand and inflation rate of the EC. Thus it will be natural to assume that the weight on inflation stabilization adopted by national FA is smaller than that of the EC, or (to simplify matters) zero 14 . Moreover, each FA will also be concerned with the level of its own expenditures. This assumption reflects two facts: (i) a higher level of fiscal expansion implies a higher crowding out of private expenditures, and this is perceived to be costly; (ii) the Stability Pact requires that the fiscal stance is on average neutral (f = 0), so that departures from a balanced budget should only be small and temporary. To take into account the second interpretation, we prefer to include into the loss function the deviations from the balanced budget, f . 15, 16 . Accordingly, we may thus postulate the following loss functions:
FA of country j:
EC (social loss function): 13 This assumption is generally accepted by the literature in this field (see the survey in the next subsection). Also notice that, for simplicity, we do not distinguish in this paper between the membership of the EU and of EMU.
14 One way to make this assumption more plausible is to assume that inflation is the same both at the national and at the EMU-wide level. 15 Banerjee (2001) assumes that the weight on inflation in the loss function of the FA is not greater than for the ECB. Gatti and van Wijnberg (1999) and Buti, Roeger and in't Veld (2001) instead assume that the national FA are not concerned with inflation. All these papers, and also Beetsma and Bovenberg (2001) , assume that the FA are also concerned with stabilizing either the level of public expenditures or the cyclically-adjusted budget balance. Our formulation (eq. 7) is the same as in Buti, Roeger and in't Veld (2001).
where r is the current short-run real rate of interest and µ, γ are positive parameters. The formulation of the social loss function assumes that the output and inflation terms share the same weight. While this is arbitrary (but not unrealistic), it avoids introducing an additional weighting parameter. It will become clear below that no qualitative result depends critically on this assumption. 17 On the basis of the loss functions (6 − 8) we can now study the interactions of the three types of policymakers from their respective points of view:
1. Given that the ECB is committed to stabilize inflation over the medium term, as implied in eq. (6), is it preferable from this point of view that the stance of fiscal policy at the national level is set on the basis of the social loss function, eq. (8), or instead would the ECB prefer that national FA only look at their domestic conditions, i.e. the aim at minimizing eq. (7) ? 2. From the view point of the EC (that is, of social welfare for the EU as a whole), and given that the ECB has received a specific mandate, is it better to direct the national FA 18 to minimize the social loss function, L S , or instead to concentrate on the more narrowly defined task of stabilizing domestic output, i.e. of minimizing L F j ? 3. Finally, from the point of view of national FA, if it turns out that the EC directs them to minimize L S , is this compatible with their structure of incentives? Or, it may be possible that they would not want to cooperate with the BEPG and instead they want to stabilize only their domestic output?
Before we proceed, we may notice that the problem examined from the viewpoint of the EC (point 2 above) is analogous to the delegation problem examined by Vickers (1985) and, in the context of central banking, by Rogoff (1985) . Just as it may be optimal, in order to minimize the social loss function, to choose a central banker who places more emphasis on inflation stabilization that does society as a whole (is more conservative, in the terminology of Rogoff) we pose here a symmetric question: given that the EC has chosen an utterly conservative central banker (as the ECB places no weight on output stabilization) could it be then optimal that, conditional on this choice, fiscal policy is assigned to a policymaker which places more weight on output stabilization than society as a whole 19 ? As we shall see, it turns out that, under the assumption that stabilization policy is feasible, the answer to this question cannot be given once and for all, but will always be conditional on the cyclical turnout of the economy, that is on the specific analysis of demand and supply shocks.
In the next section we analyze the setting of the policy instruments and the resulting equilibria. Before doing so, however, we briefly compare our approach to others which have been proposed in the recent literature on EMU.
Review of the literature on fiscal and monetary policy coordination
The twin issues of macroeconomic policy coordination within one country and cooperation across countries have had a central place in the literature on the design of macroeconomic policies. However, only recently these issues have started to be debated in reference to EMU. As remarked in the Introduction, this is surprising given that EMU provides a very relevant and challenging case study, and that the debate on other economically relevant aspects of the Treaty of Maastricht has been otherwise intense. With reference to the earlier, pre-EMU literature, several approaches may be relevant to the issues which arise with EMU, and in particular to the approach adopted in this paper:
(1) Tabellini (1986) is to our knowledge the first paper to analyze the coordination of monetary (MP) and fiscal policies (FP) in the context of a differential game modelled for a single country, where the target variable is the path of government debt across time. He shows that policy coordination increases the speed of convergence to the steady state and leads the economy closer to the planned target as compared to the outcome of the non-cooperative game.
(2) Turnovski and d'Orey (1986), following Hamada (1976) , analyze the issue of MP coordination across countries. Their model features two identical open economies, hit by aggregate demand and supply shocks. Central banks have identical, linear quadratic preferences in output and inflation. In a static framework, they compare Nash, Stackelberg and cooperative equilibria, and find that the benefits from cooperation are likely to be quite small. This conclusion is reversed by Turnovsky, Başar and d 'Orey (1988) , who analyze a dynamic version of the same model. In this framework, gains from cooperation may become quite relevant.
(3) The literature on discretionary monetary policy regimes in closed economies, originating with Barro and Gordon (1983) , generally neglects the issue of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies. However, the normative conclusions originating from this literature have helped to shape the strong status of independence assigned to the ECB in the context of EMU.
(4) The literature on the monetary implications of fiscal (in)discipline, which originates with Sargent and Wallace (1981) , emphasizes that, to the extent that the path of a government's fiscal deficit is predetermined and unsustainable, then monetary policy and the price level are no longer exogenous to it. A similar point arises in the context of the 'Fiscal Theory of the Price Level' (Woodford, 1995) . However, in these frameworks the goals of fiscal policy are not explicitly discussed, and in particular they do not include macro stabilization. Nevertheless, the scenario analyzed by Sargent and Wallace has surely been influential in motivating the emphasis on fiscal discipline as a pre-requisite for monetary stability, which has been placed in the Treaty of Maastricht and, in particular, on the design of the criteria for admission to the third phase of EMU.
Turning now to the more recent, post-EMU (more precisely, post-Treaty of Maastricht) literature, the issue of monetary-fiscal policy coordination has recently been analyzed by a number of papers, with an explicit reference to EMU 20 . That is, these papers have generally assumed a framework char-acterized by a centralized monetary authority together with decentralized, national fiscal authorities. We distinguish in particular two groups of papers: They analyze under which conditions this leads to a "wasteful strategic accumulation of government debt". In particular they argue that, in the absence of an explicit commitment by fiscal authorities, ex-post coordination at the fiscal level may actually be harmful. Dixit and Lambertini (2001a; 2001b) assume that both fiscal and monetary authorities act according to time-inconsistent rules and discuss how different coordination mechanisms may or may not alleviate the undesirable consequences of non-coordinated behavior. For the reasons which we have discussed at large in the Introduction, and in particular since we assume that the constraints on the discretionary behavior of both fiscal and monetary authorities are effective in the context of EMU, we do not pursue this line of analysis in the present paper. See Beetsma and Debrun (2002, in this volume) for a full review of all this literature (6) Adopting a different policy focus, Buti, Roeger and in't Veld (2001) analyze the interaction of monetary and fiscal authorities in a framework quite similar to the one to be developed below, but assume a single fiscal authority (which can be rationalized, with reference to EMU, assuming perfect symmetry and cooperation between all countries). Assuming that fiscal authorities do not care for inflation, they find that cooperation is desirable, in particular when the economies are hit by a supply shock. In a related, more general framework van Aarle, Engwerda and Plasmans (2001) analyze two countries, with decentralized fiscal authorities and a centralized monetary authority. Their basic framework is very similar -also for the static specification of the various loss functions -to the one which we propose below, except that they also include a "spillover" competitiveness term between the two countries. In addition, they analyze -by means of numerical simulations -the equilibrium strategies which arise in continuous time over an infinite horizon. The cases they consider include: non cooperation between the three authorities; full cooperation; coalition between the two fiscal authorities only; coalition between one fiscal authority and the monetary authority. These setups are examined under both assumptions of symmetry and asymmetry between the two countries involved. Their main finding is that cooperation is efficient for fiscal authorities in that a common stance against the ECB produces a Pareto improvement. This may not hold at the equilibrium of the fully cooperative (that is, including the ECB) game.
Monetary and fiscal policy with decentralized fiscal authorities
In this section we study the problem of coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities in a monetary union, composed of two equal-sized national economies and decentralized (at the national level) FA. To simplify the exposition and the notation, we assume the two economies to be identical and in particular we neglect the possibility of asymmetric shocks affecting either economy. We also redefine: r +π * = π * . We shall examine the case where the three authorities set their respective instruments (i, f j , f k ) simultaneously and compute the resulting Nash equilibria. 21 Appropriately substituting the aggregate demand and supply equations, the ECB shall choose the level of i so as to minimize:
Similarly, FA j and k are interested in the level of (domestic) aggregate demand, i.e. will set f j in order to minimize:
and similarly for f k . The first step to solve the model is now to compute each policmaker's best reply function, assuming as given the choice of the other authority. In particular, and following the discussion in Section 2, we shall assume that national FA are either following a directive from the EC to minimize L S , or instead to minimize L F j 22 .
FA using
Note that, as it should be expected, each authority maneuvers its policy instrument in a restrictive way (higher i, lower f ) in response to an expansionary (> 0) shock to aggregate demand ( ε 1 ) or supply ( ε 2 ).
Case I: both governments use L F j
In this sub-section, we analyze the case when the EC directs national FA to minimize L F j . To clarify, we stress that this case does not contradict the earlier assumption that the EC aims at minimizing the social loss function L S (eq. 8). Instead, we are modelling the case when, given that the EC wants to minimize L S , and that it has already assigned to one agent, the ECB, a mandate to minimize L M , it finds (second best-)optimal to assign to a second group of agents (the national FA) the mandate to minimize L F j . Hence in this case we study the Nash equilibrium which results from the interaction of the two sets of best reply functions, eqs. (11 − 12) 23 , that is:
The Nash equilibrium strategies
can be plugged into L F j , and L M , which simplify as follows:
In this case, the associated social loss can be computed naturally from the sum L
, which we do not write down in full for the sake of brevity.
Case II: both governments use L S
In this sub-section we consider the case when the two national FA determine their respective fiscal stance from the the direct minimization of L S . That is, the EC asks them to share the aggregate, union-wide set of preferences. The Nash equilibrium computed from the two relevant reply functions, eqs. (11) and (13), is then:
and L S S , which are omitted for brevity.
Comparative statics
Now we can comparatively assess the results which we have obtained in the two preceding sub-sections. For the central bank, we observe that:
entailing that:
The interpretation of this result is that the central bank prefers the fiscal stance of national governments to be set according to the minimization of L S (that is, taking into account the welfare of the community as a whole), whenever the use of the monetary instrument is costly enough. Let us not turn to the viewpoint on the national FA. We notice that L
and
On these bases, the following can be easily established:
Note that min {ε 2g , ε 2h } = ε 2g for all ε 1 > 0, while min {ε 2g , ε 2h } = ε 2h for all ε 1 < 0. If ε 1 = 0, ε 2g = ε 2h = 0. This situation is illustrated in Figure  1 , where we consider a set of parameters and demand shocks such that ε 2h is upward sloping. a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a 
Now we consider the point of view of the EC, as to whether it should direct national FA to set f j according to the minimization of either L F j or L S . We have that L Note that min {ε 2p , ε 2q } = ε 2p for all ε 1 > 0, while min {ε 2p , ε 2q } = ε 2q for all ε 1 < 0. If ε 1 = 0, ε 2p = ε 2q = 0. This situation is illustrated in Figure  2 , where again we consider the case where ε 2q is upward sloping. a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a 
Moreover, ε 2g = ε 2p and
Thus, we observe that the region where L Proposition 2 National FA will simultaneously deviate from the EC directive, i.e. from union-wide welfare maximization, for all
The region where there exists an incentive for every country in the union to deviate from union-wide welfare maximization is illustrated in Figure 3 . a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a á´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´ε   2q ε 2g,p a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
As a corollary to the above proposition, we may observe from eqs.(21 − 24) that: (i)
and: (ii) if ε 1 = 0, then also ε 2g = ε 2p = ε 2h = ε 2q = 0. This leads us to the following: Corollary 1 For ε 1 6 = 0,national and union-wide incentives will always coincide if and only if the use of the monetary instrument is costless.
Corollary 2 In the absence of aggregate demand shocks (ε 1 = 0), there would be no source of potential conflict between national FA and the EC.
Finally, using (14) and (18) we can also establish our final result:
for all ε 2 > ε 2g , when ε 1 > 0, while f NF j < f NS j for all ε 2 < ε 2g , when ε 1 < 0.
The interpretation of this result is that, when the AD shock is positive and the AS shock is also positive and large enough (that is, above the boundary common to cases I and II) then the national FA will deviate from union-wide welfare maximization and pursue a less restrictive fiscal policy. The opposite holds when the AD shock is negative and the AS shock is also negative and large enough in absolute terms (below the boundary common to cases I and II): then the national government will choose a more restrictive fiscal stance than would be recommended by union-wide welfare maximization 24 To conclude, note that our interpretation of the role of fiscal policy in the context of macro stabilization is consistent with the operation of automatic stabilizers: that is, one could designs fiscal stabilizers that generate the same fiscal impulse as it is implied by either eq. (14) or (18) . Thus our model does not imply or require that fiscal policy is set in a discretionary way. Finally, note that the assumption of only symmetric demand shocks is crucial in determining the fact that national FA will both want either to cooperate or not with the EC. In Lambertini and Rovelli (2001) we show that as soon as we introduce the possibility of asymmetric shocks, this conclusion will no longer hold, and it may well become possible that the incentive to deviate from the EC directives becomes unilateral.
national fiscal authorities cooperate in minimizing a union-wide welfare function, which includes price stability among its arguments: that is, it is better from the perspective of the central bank that the fiscal stance is set taking into account also the goal of monetary policy -instead of concentrating only on output stabilization. EC authorities and national FA, instead, may have conflicting incentives. These will arise, depending upon the relative size of aggregate shocks, even in the absence of asymmetric shocks and of aggregate demand spillovers between countries. In particular, we find that when both aggregate demand and supply shocks are positive (resp. negative) and the latter are large enough in absolute terms, then national FA will pursue a more expansionary (resp. contractionary) fiscal policy than it would be desirable from the point of view of the EC (that is, of social welfare). For instance, this might be the case of the overly expansionary (according to the EC authorities) fiscal stance adopted by the Irish government in the budget for 2001.
This brings us to the potential normative implications of our analysis, regarding the adoption of an appropriate institutional setup for EMU. Our results imply that, if the EC authorities (that is, the European Commission and the European Council) should pursue a social welfare function defined over aggregate output and inflation, then it may be necessary to endow them with appropriate enforcement devices with respect to the fiscal policy stance of individual member countries. Whether these devices will be activated in any given period, will depend upon the cyclical configuration of aggregate shocks to output and inflation. Since this conclusion has been obtained in the context of a static model without assuming any incentive to adopt a time-inconsistent behavior on the side of any authority, we believe that it is also likely to hold in more general policy setups. We have not discussed whether the specific provisions envisaged in the Stability and Growth Pact are optimal in terms of our model; however our conclusions strongly support the idea that the setting of fiscal policies by member countries needs to be disciplined, and in some instances possibly over-ruled, by the EC authorities. If this discipline were not enforced, then the volatility of inflation around its target might become excessive, and interest rates too volatile.
